Secure Storage and File-Sharing for Freedom Fighters
| Secure Storage and File-Sharing for Freedom Fighters | |
|---|---|
| Presenter(s) | Chris Wood, Liz Steininger, Brian Warner |
| Title(s) | |
| Organization(s) | Least Authority |
| Project(s) | Tahoe-LAFS, Gridsync |
| Country(ies) | |
| Social media | |
| 2017 theme | Tools & Technology |
|---|
We’ll host a conversation about the various tools, technologies, and practices for secure storage and file-sharing for internet freedom supporters. This will include a casual discussion of participants’ present needs and practices, a group-led assessment of currently available options and their shortcomings, and a brainstorm of what we want to see in future offerings. There are two goals: 1) to give attendees a better sense of their current and future options, and 2) to identify commonalities in needs among participants in order to get a better idea of where tools should be moving in this space. We would be happy to have others join us in hosting this conversation.
| Format | Conversation |
|---|---|
| Target Groups | |
| Length | 1 hour |
| Skill Level | Novice |
| Language | English |
Session Outputs
Next Steps
Additional Notes
Relevant Resources
Contributors
Potential Tools
(also see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison_of_file_hosting_services)
- Dropbox
- Google Docs
- Etherpad
- Owncloud/NextCloud
- Onionshare
- SpiderOak
- Tresorit (like Dropbox but encrypted)
- Zettabox
- Box.net
- Bitsync (from Bittorrent)
- SyncThing
- Sparkleshare
- Tahoe-LAFS
- IPFS
- Storj
- rsync.net
- casebox (for lawyers)
- sandstorm.io
- peerio
- keybase
- FramaForm
- Maadix.net
- Martus
- duplicati
Features
- Form input (e.g. google docs)
- collaborative editing
- file sharing
- backup
- publishing
- versioning / conflict resolution
- censorship tolerance
- looks mainstream (don't have obvious crypto apps installed on your phone)
- deniability
- selective access
- predictable security properties, predictable behavior
Tradeoffs
- ACLs (access control lists) vs server-sees-everything
- self-hosted vs reliability
- client-side encryption vs web access
- low bandwidth
- centralized
some use cases
- JFK lawyers: volunteer legal help for noncitizen detainees
- new volunteers arrive at airport, want to help
- need to record intake info / notes on victims, share with back-office legal staff
- data is sensitive, must not be gathered in one place where it could be stolen
- currently using a big google docs spreadsheet, want something better
- ideally the JFK-side lawyer can drop an intake record into a write-only directory, where back-office staff can read it (but nobody at the airport)
- Panama Papers investigations, collaborative story editing
- need to exchange draft stories, notes, sensitive docs
- panic 5-minute-warning leave-the-country
- want to quickly erase everything and pick up a cloud copy later
Wishlist
- client-side encrypted
- open-source, audited
- server runs in different (user-choosable) jurisdiction
- easy to use
- install anywhere: phones, computers, servers
- clear policy/process for deletion: removing an item should really remove it, not leave parts visible to forensics